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BRIDLING MARKET DOMINANCE: 
A VIEW FROM JAMAICA 
Barbara Lee 
Abstract. In exploring the specific theme of market 
dominance in small states, this chapter highlights some of 
the peculiarities of such states, focusing on Jamaica, and 
through that lens discusses the treatment of dominance as 
a policy issue and the resultant legal framework. Whereas 
at the most general level, competition law seeks to ensure 
that domestic markets are not impeded by anti-competitive 
practices and that competitive forces are allowed to 
determine how markets are organised, this chapter argues 
that each state must determine the more specific objectives 
which its law must serve. The chapter explains that the 
Jamaican policymakers were obviously operating on the 
accepted principle that competition law must fit the 
circumstances of the state in which it is being implemented; 
the view being that a small state must by necessity be more 
tolerant than larger states would be, of higher levels of 
concentration in the market, if their significant industries 
are to be competitive in the regional and global arenas. The 
chapter posits that rigorous enforcement of competition law 
will protect the competitive process, thereby neutralising 
shocks to the economy. 
1. Introduction 
There is no general agreement as to how a small state is to be defined. 
The World Bank1 and the Commonwealth Secretariat2 define a small 
state as one with a population of 1.5 million or fewer. Countries like 
Papua New Guinea, Cuba, Singapore and Jamaica, with populations 
exceeding 2 million, are included as members of the Alliance of Small 
Island States (AOSIS)3 which operates as a lobby group within the United 
Nations. The size of GNP and the land area have also been proposed as 
1 See http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/html/smallstates.nsf/. 
2 See http:/ /www.tlwrnmmonwealth.org/. 
3 See http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis/. 
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measurements of size (Downes, 1988). In recognition of the difficulties 
associated with defining what is a small state or a small economy as an 
absolute concept, during negotiations in the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas the expression /1 smaller economies" rather than /1 small 
economies" was used as /1 a relative concept based on countries' resource 
bases and levels of development" (Association of Caribbean States, 2001). 
In WTO negotiations, the concept of vulnerability was associated with 
the definition of smallness, and accordingly the term /1 small vulnerable 
economies" is commonly used (see Werner, 2008). 
No matter how they are defined, small states need to promote market 
efficiency as much as, if not more than, larger ones, given that the former 
tend to be highly exposed to external shocks (Briguglio et al., 2006), and 
therefore require a properly functioning market to withstand or bounce 
back from such shocks. In this regard properly designed competition law 
and policy are important instruments, even in the smallest of states. One 
of the main purposes of competition law and policy is to protect the 
consumer against abuse of dominant positions; however in attaining this 
aim, competition law and policy also foster rapid market adjustment. 
This chapter focuses on dominance in small states, referring to the factors 
which facilitate such dominance, referred to by Briguglio and Buttigieg 
(2004) as /1 ease of market dominance", and the measures available for 
curbing it. Practical examples, where appropriate, will be drawn 
primarily from the Jamaican experience. 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the major features 
of the market in small states, while Section 3 deals with the Fair 
Competition Act of Jamaica and discusses how the law is structured to 
deal with the matter of market adjustment. Section 4 highlights 
viewpoints on the adequacy of competition law. Section 5 presents two 
case studies which compare outcomes under contrasting legislative 
frameworks. Section 6 concludes the chapter. 
2. Features of the Market in Small States 
Natural Monopolies 
Briguglio and Buttigieg (2004) tell us that, inter alia, small states are likely 
to be characterised by natural monopolies in utilities such as electricity, 
fixed line telephony, gas and water. These observations are, to varying 
degrees, true of all Caribbean States. Notwithstanding the adoption of 
extensive privatisation and trade liberalisation measures in the late 1980s 
into the 1990s, these sectors have remained monopolies, to a very large 
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extent. Natural gas remains a monopoly in Barbados and Trinidad & 
Tobago. The same is true of electricity for these states as well, while in 
Jamaica there is partial liberalisation, allowing for limited competition in 
generation. In this context, the electricity produced by the bauxite 
companies and a few other independent producers account for 30% of 
electricity generation, which has to be sold to the incumbent, Jamaica Public 
Service Company. Whereas it is acknowledged that this arrangement 
provides a reliable and relatively cheap source of electricity, there is doubt 
as to whether the final consumer manages to benefit from this form of 
privatisation and the partial liberalisation of the electricity sector. 
Essentially, fixed line telephony remains a monopoly in all three states, 
but there is vibrant competition in mobile and international services. In 
Jamaica where the sector was liberalised on a phased basis, with full 
liberalisation occurring in March of 2003, a licence was actually issued 
in 2002 for a second fixed line provider (wireless) to enter the market, 
but to date the licensee has not been able to start operations. For one 
thing, it seems not to have had deep enough pockets to follow through; 
and secondly, the chosen technology was not only quite unsuitable for 
Jamaica's topography, but was very mature and was heading toward 
obsolescence. 
Natural monopolies are characterised by factors such as large capital 
outlays and "relatively large overhead costs" which prevent duplication 
and therefore competition; they occur where the market is not large 
enough to sustain competition at an efficient scale; and they tend to 
demonstrate appreciable economies of scale and/ or scope; they are an 
acceptable phenomenon of small markets, despite their legendary 
rampant rent-seeking conduct. In an effort to achieve balance, 
governments the world over and certainly in the Caribbean small states, 
have relied on regulation of natural monopolies. 
In Jamaica, the organisation which regulates the utilities is the Office of 
Utilities Regulation (OUR)-water and electricity being fully regulated; 
while for competition matters in telecommunications, the OUR must 
consult with and defer to the Fair Trading Commission (FTC). 
Competition in the mobile telephony market has been legendary, due 
largely to forbearance by the Regulator to regulate that market. The 
Government's objective was to increase the level of telephone penetration 
in the country; and the result was that subscribers increased from 300,000 
in January 2001 to 2,745,400 by September 2005. 
The FTC has had to be vigilant in monitoring the advertising wars that 
have ensued between the incumbent and one particularly strong new 
entrant. Information contained in advertisements of ever evolving new 
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services have come under heavy scrutiny, to ensure that the consumer 
is not misled; and competition is not distorted. Section 37 of the Fair 
Competition Act (FCA) prohibits misleading advertising; and the FTC 
has interpreted the section to mean that an advertisement can mislead 
by what it expresses as well as by what it fails to express; and by the 
inferences that can be drawn from the placement of objects in relation 
to one another. 
Competition in this area has been beneficial to several communities and 
other groupings in society. Sports clubs and sporting activities have been 
probably the greatest beneficiaries, not only locally but regionally. 
Exclusive promotion agreements are carefully scrutinised by the FTC to 
maintain healthy competition. Starting out in 2000 with 100 percent 
market share in the mobile market the incumbent began to suffer loss of 
market share immediately upon the entry of the Irish provider - Digicel, 
the market share of which was 60.2 percent as at September 2005, 
compared to the incumbent' s 36.2 percent. A third provider held 3.6 
percent. 
The telecommunications sector in Jamaica clearly demonstrates that 
liberalisation together with unimpeded competition and keen 
enforcement of competition law will contribute to entrepreneurship and 
economic growth and could discipline dominant firms, thereby 
enhancing consumer welfare. 
Unfortunately the same cannot be said of the electricity sector. By 
Ministerial Order dated February 2001, all aspects of the operations of 
the incumbent Jamaica Public Service Company (JPSCo) were exempt 
from the jurisdiction of the Fair Competition Act. This means that even 
though power generation was opened up to competition, the FTC cannot 
enforce the rules of competition against the dominant producer, which 
must be to the detriment of the market. 
The power of the Minister to grant the relevant exemption is established 
under Section 3(h) of the FCA, which states that "Nothing in this Act 
shall apply to - such other business or activity declared by the Minister 
by order subject to affirmative resolution." It must be noted too, that 
under its current licence the JPSCo is the sole purchaser of all new 
capacity generated by independent power producers. The Company also 
has an exclusive right for transmission, distribution/retail business. 
Ease of Dominance 
While the factors that support the existence of natural monopolies in 
small states are principally the usual market realities related to scale 
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economies, there tend to be additional factors underpinning market 
dominance in sectors other than the utilities. These are mostly associated 
with barriers to market entry. 
In small states, barriers to entry that support dominance tend to be very 
common. These often allow dominant firms in a small state to remain 
dominant even after any superior competitive performance which they 
might have exhibited in their early history has disappeared. Briguglio 
and Buttigieg (2004) characterise " ... the poor chances of success of 
setting [up] new business, in goods and services already supplied by 
existing firms" as a natural barrier to entry. This could happen, for 
example, where capital is scarce and obtaining credit might be influenced 
by social and family ties rather than by sound business plans, thus 
limiting the possibilities for competition. Not least among these natural 
barriers to entry can be cultural allegiances to products which have taken 
on iconic "personalities" over time. 
This situation is evident in the brewery sector in Jamaica. Domestic beer 
consumption is high and the Jamaican consumer has been exposed to 
many brands of beer. Nonetheless the brewery Red Stripe Limited 
remains dominant after 80 years of its existence, encountering weak 
challenge for the first time some four years ago. In Jamaica, beer means 
Red Stripe. 
Another natural barrier to entry in Jamaica, and in other small island 
states in the Caribbean, is high transportation costs, given the fact that 
for an island, cross-border trade is largely by sea or air. This often 
translates into bulk buying through dominant firms, which in turn 
control the distribution channels and firms are maintained in their 
relative positions along the distribution chain. 
To the extent that interlocking relationships in small states allow business 
persons to have the ear of the policymakers, resulting policy decisions 
may give rise to Government-created barriers to entry. Such artificial 
barriers might manifest as state aid, concessions, preferential awards 
of contracts or tax breaks, which can amount to the picking of winners/ 
promotion of national champions; and therefore distortion of 
competition. 
Other government-created barriers to entry which might not be peculiar 
to small states, include legislation such as those which address 
intellectual property rights and dumping. The power which resides in 
agents of the Government in the granting of licences and permits may 
also be exerted in a manner which creates a significant barrier to entry 
and facilitates dominance. 
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3. Dominance Under the Jamaica Fair Competition Act 
It is important to indicate that market dominance (though often 
associated with monopoly power) is not an offence under the Jamaica 
Fair Competition Act as indeed it is not in other countries where 
competition legislation is in force. It is the abuse of that position that is 
punishable. A firm occupies a dominant position if: 
11 
••• by itself or together with an interconnected company, 
it occupies such a position of economic strength as will 
enable it to operate in the market without effective 
constraints from its competitors or potential competitors". 
(Fair Competition Act, Section 19) 
The 1945 case of United States v Aluminium Company of America 
(Alcoa), referenced in many textbooks, including Gellhom et al. 
(2004:110). provides us with an understanding as to why a dominant 
firm would need to be constrained. The learned Judge in the case 
suggested that monopoly power is feared because a firm holding such 
power can restrict output; raise prices and transfer income from 
customers to producers, thereby excluding rivals from the market 11 ••• 
by means other than superior performance in the form of better products, 
prices and service." 
Fundamentally, competition law seeks to encourage, promote and 
maintain competition; and competition is affected by the behaviour/ 
conduct of firms and the structure of markets. Thus competition law 
controls firms' behaviour by prohibiting, among other things, anti-
competitive agreements and the abuse of dominance; while the 
application of merger control provisions prevents mergers that could 
result in anti-competitive levels of concentration in the market. 
Structure Approach to Market Adjustment 
In the period leading up to the enactment of the FCA, there was 
considerable debate on features of the Act that could have a negative 
impact on investment in the newly liberalised economy. One such feature 
was merger control. Critical private sector groupings took the position 
that given Jamaica's level of economic development and the relatively 
small size of many of its firms - factors which have implications for the 
country's competitiveness, not just at the regional level but globally-
firms should be allowed to merge without being subjected to the ri301lfs 
of competition oversight. 
Of course, this is not a view alien to the considerations which inform 
competition law and policy. Gellhom et al. (2004: 404) list a number of 
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reasons why a society might wish to leave firms "relatively free to buy 
or sell entire companies or specific assets: 
(i) mergers can bring superior managerial or technical skill to bear on 
underused assets; 
(ii) [they] can yield economies of scale and scope that reduce cost, 
improve quality, and boost output; 
(iii) the possibility of a hostile takeover can discourage incumbent 
managers from behaving in ways that fail to maximise profits; 
(iv) a merger can enable a business owner to sell his firm to someone 
who is already familiar with the industry and might be in a better 
position to pay the highest price." 
Gellholm et al. (2004: 404) go further by stating that "The prospect of a 
lucrative sale induces entrepreneurs to form new firms and thereby spurs 
competition by facilitating entry and exit" and capping their arguments 
with the statement that" ... many mergers pose few risks to competition 
... where for example, the merging firms are relatively small or entry into 
their markets is easy." In some respects, with its relatively small firms, 
the Jamaican economy could be seen as fitting neatly into this scenario. 
It must be acknowledged that over the last five years, Jamaica has seen 
a number of mergers, predominantly in the banking, insurance and 
media sectors; and the FTC has been particularly concerned about those 
mergers that have occurred between banks and insurance companies. 
The "gut" reaction of the FTC is that consumers will be pigeonholed 
into using the services of specific providers, where, given choice they 
might have gone elsewhere. To the extent that horizontal mergers 
increase the level of concentration in a market, and could effectively 
reduce competition, they ought to come under the scrutiny of 
competition law. 
The enforcement agency must have the opportunity to analyse a merger 
transaction and determine whether such a transaction produces or is likely 
to produce efficiencies; and whether some of the gains accruing will be 
passed on to the consumer. Surely rigid negative assumptions about 
mergers are wholly undesirable. 
A small state must determine, among other things, its own thresholds; its 
own competitive test; and list of factors to be weighted in determining 
competitive impact. Ultimately it must strike the balance that it considers 
desirable for its own market. 
Accordingly, the FTC has argued, in a paper presented to its portfolio 
minister in May 2006, that national policy regarding mergers is now 
ripe for review. 
185 
Small States and the Pillars of Economic Resilience 
Conduct Remedies 
In the absence of structural remedies the competition authority of a small 
state must be doubly vigilant in its application of the conduct remedies 
provided under the law, for disciplining dominant firms. Sections 19 -
21 of the FCA specifically address the conduct of dominant firms, 
prohibiting, among other things: 
• restricting the entry of persons into any market; 
• eliminating any person from any market; 
• imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other uncompetitive 
practices; 
• limiting production of goods or services to the prejudice of consumers; 
• making the conclusion of agreements subject to supplementary 
obligations, which by their nature, or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such agreements. 
An enterprise will not be treated as abusing its dominant position if it is 
shown that (a) its conduct was exclusively directed to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or 
economic progress; and (b) consumers are allowed a fair share of the 
resulting benefit. Further, an enterprise would not be treated as abusing 
its dominant position if the only reason for the relevant conduct is to 
enforce an intellectual property right. 
Where the FTC finds that an enterprise has abused, or is abusing a 
dominant position and that such abuse has had, is having, or is likely to 
have the effect of lessening competition substantially in a market, the 
Commission shall direct the enterprise to "take such steps as are 
necessary and reasonable to overcome the effects of the abuse in the 
market concerned." 
The FTC is also enjoined, under Section 21(2) " ... to consider whether 
the practice is a result of superior competitive performance" in 
determining whether a practice has had, is having or is likely to have 
the effect of lessening competition substantially. 
It is therefore clear from the wording of the sections of the Act which 
specifically address dominance, that in enforcing the law the Competition 
Authority is expected to take great care to ensure that it promotes 
competition, not stifle it; that innovation and economic progress are 
enhanced; that creativity through the exercise of intellectual property 
rights is not smothered; and that consumers ultimately benefit. Most 
significantly the Act supports the principle that even as it seeks to 
constrain the behaviour of dominant firms, competition enforcement 
must encourage rather than punish "superior competitive performance." 
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4. Viewpoints on the Adequacy of Competition Law 
It is sometimes argued that in small states certain champion industries 
must be sheltered from too much competition, that a minimum size is 
required in order to compete effectively in global markets, that a 
combination of firms could improve efficiency and attain scale 
economies, and that therefore competition policy must determine how 
to defend these axial industries.4 This argument is more suited for a 
discussion about trade remedies than for competition policy. Even in 
the context of trade remedies, sheltering from competition is not the 
best option. As Veroneau (2007: 2) argues: 
"Each society must find a way to address the needs of those who 
may be dislocated by change and cushion the transition. But 
backsliding and erecting walls and barriers to trade is not the 
answer. Trade barriers protect a few at the expense of the many 
and countries that fail to resist protectionism actions risk slower 
growth, inefficient and non-competitive sectors, greater 
unemployment and increased inflation in the longer term." 
5. Case Studies 
This section will present two cases, one which demonstrates how the 
FTC applied competition law to curb the dominance of a local icon and 
enhance and promote competition and the second demonstrates how 
government intervention into one market distorted the competitive 
process and led to chaos and disruption in the economy. 
The Red Stripe Case 
As previously mentioned, Red Stripe Limited was and is the dominant 
brewery in Jamaica, which according to the FTC, holds over 90 percent 
market share in 2001 - 2002.5 In 2002 it came to the attention of the FTC 
that the company had entered into several sales and promotional 
arrangements with various distribution outlets. The ensuing 
investigation revealed that the relevant arrangements prohibited the 
promotion of competing products at selected outlets; demanded sales 
4 For example Dr Trevor Farrell, Economist, speaking at a Regional Conference held in 
Barbados in November 2006; and hosted by the Organisation of Commonwealth Caribbean 
Bar Associations and the Caribbean Court of Justice, expressed the view that Caribbean 
people, in embracing competition law and policy, need to be mindtul of" axial industries 
of the Caribbean" such as tourism and energy, which are replacing earlier axial industries 
such as banana and sugar. 
5 The company disagreed that it holds such a large market share, contending that the 
relevant market includes all alcoholic beverages and not just beer as the FTC determined. 
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data on competing brands; prohibited sales and promotion of competing 
products at sponsored events; recommended that competing products 
be sold at premium prices at sponsored events; and provided for post-
terminate preferential treatment. 
Despite its non-admission of any breach, the company agreed to enter 
into a Consent Agreement with the FTC, in which it agreed, in respect 
of sponsorship at events, that, among other things: 
• no agreements would exceed three years or provide for an option to 
renew and/ or for any rights of first refusal; 
• notice period for termination of any agreement without cause would 
be linked to the value of the sponsorship provided. 
With respect to promotional arrangements at outlets the company 
agreed, that, among other things: 
• the number of outlets would be reduced to a number agreed by the 
FTC; 
• duration would not exceed twelve consecutive months; 
• there would be no option to renew, nor would there be any right of 
first refusal; 
• no agreement would seek to restrict or limit competing products from 
being displayed for sales purposes and dimensions of such displays. 
As a direct result of the action taken against Red Stripe, the firm that 
entered the market at the time has not only been able to survive but has 
managed to increase its annual revenue by some 200 percent, which 
could mean a significantly increased market share. It has also carved 
out a viable niche for itself in the hotel sector. Further, in the last year, 
another rival has entered the market, without having to face the barriers 
faced by the first entrant and consumers have benefited from the variety 
now available to them. 
Caribbean Cement Company 
Anti-dumping and Subsidies Laws were considered to be integral to 
the process of economic liberalisation of Jamaica in the early 1990s. The 
appropriate statutory instruments were put in place, and the Anti-
dumping and Subsidies Commission (ADSC) was established. 
To the extent that anti-dumping laws seek to protect domestic industries 
from competition, those measures are often seen to be in direct conflict 
with the principles of competition; and never was this conflict made 
more stark than in 2001 when the sole producer of cement in Jamaica, 
Caribbean Cement Company Limited (CCCL), filed a complaint with 
the ADSC, alleging that since 1999 cement was being dumped into the 
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country, resulting in injury to its production; loss of sales and market 
share; and therefore loss of profitability. At the end of an investigation, 
the Anti-dumping Commission agreed; and dumping duties of 89.79 
percent were imposed on the relevant importer. This process repeated 
itself in 2002 and again in 2004, when upon the recommendation of the 
ADSC, the Government increased the applied tariff on cement from 15 
percent to 40 percent. The CCCL promised not to increase prices for a 
specified period, and only with the government's approval. 
Upon becoming aware of the matter in 2001, the FTC prepared and 
delivered an opinion to its Portfolio Minister, setting out its concerns 
and cautioning the authorities to carefully analyse from the perspective 
of the overall impact on competition and consumer welfare, the likely 
results of the measures taken. The FTC encouraged the Minister to 
"carefully weigh the choice of providing protection for a particular 
company at the cost of the consumer and wider economic objectives." It 
was pointed was out that CCCL' s undertaking not to raise prices without 
the Government's approval might not be a sufficiently strong safeguard 
to mimic a competitive market. 
Despite the caution of the FTC and the efforts of the parliamentary 
opposition, to persuade the government not to intervene in the manner 
requested, the fifty year old CCCL was afforded protection through the 
imposition of dumping duties, increased tariff, and a safeguard measure 
of 25.83 percent. 
Indeed, one poignant intervention in Parliament was" you cannot be under 
supplying and expect to get protection." (The Daily Gleaner, March 21, 
2007). At the relevant time, market demand for cement amounted to 
900,000 metric tom1es per year and CCCL was producing 700,000 metric 
tonnes. In 2005 CCCL' s production level had improved to 844,840 metric 
tonnes, but the Trade Board advised that the company would have been 
"unable to keep pace with the robust demand in the construction sector ... " 
By this time firms which had hitherto been importing cement had fallen 
out of the market. The 2007 World Cup Cricket was imminent and large 
construction projects were underway, including a new multi-purpose 
stadium at which warm-up matches were to be played. New schools were 
being built and highways were being constructed. 
A crisis had emerged in the construction industry. Public sector as well as 
private sector construction ground to a halt; and in the middle of all that, 
reports surfaced that CCCL had released sub-standard cement onto the 
market. These reports were substantiated by cracking and crumbling 
structures, resulting in the Company paying out J$305 million by way of 
compensation, as at December 2006. 
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In the wake of this crisis, the Government, as a first step to addressing 
the problem, rolled back the tariff to the original 15 percent for three 
months. This did very little to improve the situation: three months was 
much too short a period to allow persons interested in resuming 
importation to place orders and have the product shipped to Jamaica 
from such far away places as Thailand. Eventually the government was 
forced to remove the tariff altogether, for an indefinite period. 
The sector is now climbing back to competitiveness, with importation 
increasing; but there is no guarantee that the current tariff structure will 
not change. As at March 2007 a 42.5 kg bag of CCCL cement was being 
sold for J$464.84 while a 42.5 kg bag of imported cement was being sold 
by one importer for J$369.00 and a 50 kg bag sold by another importer 
for J$430.00. This translates into J$10.94 per kilo for CCCL cement; J$8.64 
for one importer's and J$8.60 for cement from the second. Indeed, as at 
December 2005 there were ten companies importing cement into the 
country and consumers are benefiting from competitive prices. 
The cement experience clearly demonstrates some of the dangers of 
picking winners and promoting national champions-which is easily 
pursued under anti-dumping laws. It gives muscle to the argument that 
effective competition is the most effective means by which a country, 
regardless of how smalt will decide who will produce what; to whom 
those goods and services will be allocated; and at what price. Trade 
remedies ought to be resorted to as measures of very last resort; and 
should be used sparingly. One can only hope that the cement experience 
has taught some lessons which extend far beyond the specific industry 
and which can inform policy approaches by other small states. 
6. Conclusion 
A dominant firm will tend to maintain its position in a market but there 
needs to be a credible appreciation of the adequacy of competition law 
to constrain the behaviour of such a firm. Rather than relying on 
mechanisms which seek to protect the few at the expense of the rest of 
society, small states should not shirk from employing competition law 
and policy, to promote rivalry among firms. This in turn will maximise 
consumer welfare. Its enforcement must be strict, consistent, and 
transparent. Competition policy is a particularly useful tool in small 
states, where dominance is not always a result of superior competitive 
performance. In monitoring the behaviour of firms in the market 
competition law promotes efficiency, which in turn produces good-
quality goods and services at competitive prices. In being provided with 
choice, consumers are able to switch and the producers of goods and 
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services are forced to make the necessary adjustments. Competition 
policy and law is a necessary support in a market economy. It offers the 
most objective means through which markets will be able to adjust to 
shocks, thereby enhancing their economic resilience. 
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